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Shaky emerging economies in view of the global financial crisis: The Turkish economy 
after three decades of liberal reforms* 
Faruk ÜLGEN 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2007/08 global financial crisis raises again the issue of how interdependencies between 
idiosyncratic bank risks and financial systems’ stability might be better managed to prevent 
the recurrence of such crises. Monetary and financial authorities all around the world 
implement emergency policies. But they do not consider a suitable analysis of the financial-
instability hypothesis which would be able to point up the weaknesses of the dominant 
market-oriented monetary and financial regulatory framework. In a recent paper, Frenkel and 
Rapetti (2009) argued that there are some lessons that have been learnt from three decades of 
several financial crises in developing countries. 
In the wake of the global change of a new accumulation regime in the major capitalist 
economies, the opening up and liberalisation process of emerging economies since the 1980s 
has provoked great expectations that resulted in recurrent crises. Large capital inflows, 
without relevant economic policies and regulatory frames, have increased structural fragilities 
and created large economic imbalances as well as social distortions. As the lack of proper 
institutional structures failed to channel capital inflows into sustainable productive investment 
plans, the speculative investments gained ground on development objectives and exacerbated 
monetary and financial instabilities. Although the emerging markets seem not to be dragged 
into the heart of the 2007/08 crisis yet, their structural vulnerabilities continue to haunt the 
future of the path-dependent growth policies. 
The Turkish economy represents an interesting study case in order to assess the role of 
a liberalised macroeconomic environment, subsequent economic policies and regulatory 
failures which are the source of perverse sequencing in the economic transformation process. 
The main argument in this paper is that since the financial and economic integration of the 
Turkish economy had (and has) a preference for a rapid liberalisation process without 
considering the structural needs and capacities of the whole economy, government had (and 
has) no room to conduct consistent macroeconomic policies in order to frame sustainable 
economic and social environment. Consequently, one should expect new crises in the 
aftermath of the actual global crisis. 
The next section presents theoretical grounds on the constraints and consequences of a 
hasty financial liberalisation and points out that acting as a magnet for unstable capital 
movements in an unstable environment the swift opening-up of domestic markets leads 
market reforms to fuel recurrent monetary and financial crises. The third section recalls the 
main banking and financial reforms implemented in Turkey since the 1980s and brings to the 
fore their effects on the Turkish economy. Increasing monetary disequilibria (high and 
volatile inflation and interest rates) and subsequent stabilisation programmes put the economy 
under a persistent burden and reduced its ability to cope with external and internal difficulties 
in order to reach a sustainable growth path. Then, we argue that the Turkish crises arose from 
bad macroeconomic policies founded on the neo-liberal shock therapy that triggered boom-
and-bust cycles. The fourth section analyses the economic situation on the eve of the 2001 
crisis through the rise of banking risks inferred by irregular behaviour. It shows that contrary 
to the hypotheses of shock therapy models, there is no spontaneous mechanism of competition 
which could incite market actors to adopt behaviour that would turn out to be efficient on the 
                                                
* Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Séminaire MoFiiDev-CREG : Le système monétaire 
international après la crise, 8 avril 2011, Université Pierre Mendès France-Grenoble 2 and the Research 
Network Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies (FMM) 14th conference: “ ‘Stabilising an unequal 
economy?’ Public debt, financial regulation, and income distribution”, 29–30 October 2010, Berlin.  
I would like to thank all conference participants for their remarks and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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macroeconomic level. In fact, the reforms provoke modifications that generate a macular 
degeneration encouraged by the speculative financing of the national debt. The fifth section 
explains that the high growth era in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 Turkish crises is not due 
to a strengthening of internal resilience through the improvement of income distribution or 
expansionist stabilisation policies, neither is it due to the improvement of external equilibrium 
through the current account balance and capital inflows. The growth is rather related to the 
cyclical opportunities due to the global speculative boom in the world during 2003-2007 as 
soaring and abundant speculative liquidities on global markets in the aftermath of the dotcom 
crisis have spurred emerging economies. In the face of the current global reversal of which 
the effects seems expand into the peripheral economies from the end of 2009, the Turkish 
economy seems not to be able to prevent the world-wide consequences of the 2007/08 
financial turmoil as its vulnerabilities remain worrisome. Its competitiveness remains weak, 
the sustainability of its financial system as well as that of its industries depend closely on 
unstable capital inflows and the growth path is not reinforced by an improvement of income 
distribution which would be able to contribute to the increase of national accumulation. The 
last section concludes. 
 
2. Constraints and consequences of the financial liberalisation  
The financial liberalisation is considered as a necessary step in market-oriented reforms in 
emerging economies in the process of economic development (IMF, 1997, Summers, 2000). 
Advocating in favour of the financial liberalisation, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Obstfeld 
(1998, p. 10) note that “Economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential advantages of 
global financial trading”. Blundell-Wignall and Browne (1991) presents a comprehensive 
summary of the literature the major arguments of which are now well known: International 
(liberalised) financial markets allow economic agents to pool various risks; developing 
countries with little capital can borrow from abroad to finance investment, when capital 
markets are perfectly integrated, then investors tap the world savings pool to undertake 
investment in each country independently of domestic saving. The continuous global trading 
and innovations in internationally traded financial instruments leads agents to arbitrage and 
drive the risk-adjusted nominal rate of return on financial assets into uniformity. Such 
developments are expected to improve the allocation of savings and investment in the world 
economy (Fischer, 1998). Henry (2003) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) assert that capital 
account liberalisation had a positive impact on the growth in both advanced and emerging 
market economies while Bekaert et al. (2003) find that the effects of both capital account 
liberalisation and equity market liberalisation are associated with subsequent economic 
growth. In a Hayekian vein, Rapaczynski (1996) asserts that relevant institutions should 
emerge spontaneously through the liberalized market’s dynamics.  
However, acting as a magnet for unstable speculative investor behaviour in an 
unstable environment, hasty opening-up of domestic markets and financial liberalisation lead 
to the fact that market reforms are often accompanied by severe and recurrent crises. On 
liberalised markets, a general shortening of time horizons of economic agents is observed as 
large government budget deficits or high inflation could lead foreign investors to exit 
emerging markets at the first sign of trouble (Prasad and Rajan, 2008). Several studies show 
the negative consequences of the capital account liberalisation and the retreat of (macro) 
regulatory mechanisms in emerging economies (Goldstein and Turner, 1996, Ülgen, 2008) as 
well as in advanced economies (Griefel-Tatje and Lovell, 1996, Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). 
The increase of external liquidities can lead to more conservative monetary policies against 
expected inflation and then to a rise of domestic interest rates that reduces the bank credit 
available for productive plans. Further, inflows can provoke exchange rate appreciation and 
reduce the price competitiveness of tradable goods and impede economic growth. Such 
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consequences are sources of macroeconomic instability without improving economic 
structure.  
Spontaneous evolution of market institutions reveals to be complex and difficult to be 
implemented. Great resiliency of local structures, hasty implementations and lack of 
regulatory structures can provoke serious macroeconomic disequilibria. Business failures and 
banking and financial crises succeed one another and reduce the credibility of reforms in 
public opinion (Ülgen, 2007). Another binding constraint to add to this evolution is the 
growing inequalities and an increasingly unequal income distribution leading to a lower 
economic growth in the long run. 
Third generation models of crises show how problems in the banking and financial 
system interact with currency crises, and how these crises can have real effects on the whole 
economy (Chang and Velasco, 2001). These models also put to the fore the interdependencies 
between domestic structures and conditions under which the capital account liberalisation is 
implemented. The success of reforms depends on minimal conditions required in the 
development of the banking and financial system (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) but also on the 
evolution of regulatory supervision structures previous to the liberalisation. But in emerging 
financial systems, the liberalisation is implemented quickly despite weak regulatory schemes 
the soundness of which plays a decisive role in systemic stability (Alper and Öniş, 2002, 
Ganioğlu, 2007).  
The financial stability reveals to be a sine qua non condition of the economic growth. 
In the case of Asian countries (Irwin and Vines, 1999) as well as in the case of the Turkish 
and Argentina crises (Eichengreen, 2001), vulnerabilities seem to be accentuated by capital 
markets liberalisation when domestic markets are not yet prepared for the consequences of 
such changes. Reforms generate various movements of innovation in financial markets and 
the opening up submits domestic savings to the effects of global phenomena that suddenly 
expose banks to new practices on public debt and on real estate and derivative markets. The 
increasing power of the short-term financial flows and the weight of the capital movements on 
the liquidity of the banking system affect the commitments of banks by leading them to 
privilege the portfolio investments at the expense of long-term investments, what engenders 
severe problems for the efficiency of the credit system.  
Prasad et al. (2003) assert that financial integration has to be implemented and 
controlled with precaution in order to reinforce the reform absorption capacity of economies. 
Characteristic differences between emerging economies call for different and various ways of 
imagining and implementing reforms and their speed should be graduated in order to satisfy 
the society’s targets through the determination of authorities to lead sustainable development 
policies (Stiglitz, 2008). Voluntary and conscious intervention of authorities should aim to 
create and reinforce a frame consistent with the needs and capacities of economies in 
transition. Stiglitz et al. (2006) advocate therefore in favour of capital inflows control to 
protect the inflows from the volatility of speculative finance. 
Following the example of numerous emerging economies, the Turkish economy 
constitutes a study case as its crises since the 1980s arose from bad macroeconomic policies 
which implemented neo-liberal shock therapy model of the triptych ‘stabilisation-
liberalisation-privatisation’ and then triggered boom-and-bust cycles. 
 
3. Banking reforms, increasing disequilibria and stabilisation programmes 
From 1980, Turkey turns to a liberal model abandoning interventionist development policies 
of the 1960-70s. The abolition of the previous bank regulatory schemes constitutes one of the 
first steps in the transition of the Turkish economy towards a more opened market economy. 
During the period of several reforms between 1980 and 1994, formal measures are quickly 
taken by replacing the development of the banking system on a fast liberalisation and on an 
opening to the international competition. This period of reforms resulted in a first large-scale 
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twin crisis (foreign exchange and banking crisis) in 1994 and opened a new era of successive 
stabilisation programmes while with the liberalisation of the capital account in 1989, the 
economy became more integrated into the global economy. This evolution made the 
sustainability of the national debt closely dependent on the sensitivity of markets to the 
current exchange-rate regime and to the problems of liquidity of the banking system. 
The first phase (1980-1983) took place within the framework of stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programmes. This phase of application of the shock therapy was based 
on the hypothesis that a fast opening and liberalisation would lead markets to stabilise 
spontaneously. Controls and regulations (ceilings on interest rates, conditions of entry into the 
banking markets) were appreciably reduced or abolished. The financial modernization was 
based on the development of securities markets; the first certificates of deposits appeared in 
July 1980 and the Council of capital markets with discretionary power is established in 1982. 
However, the restrictive monetary policy implemented during this period reduced strongly the 
domestic demand and contributed to the deterioration of the real sector’s situation. 
In this context of wild economic freedom, the increased competition amongst banks 
for the collection of the deposits, but also the emergence of ‘bankers’, a kind of financial 
intermediaries (of a number exceeding several thousand establishments) working in a Ponzi 
scheme through the aggressive issues of certificates of deposits, provoked an intense pressure 
on interest rates1. The lack of a regulatory environment to guide the activities of banks and to 
intervene in the resolution of possible shocks and liquidity problems led to bankruptcies of 
some financial institutions in 1982. This revealed that the liberalisation and the subsequent 
increased wild competition were not enough to strengthen the financial system. 
The second phase (1983-1988) was more intensive in institutional reforms. In order to 
meet the expectations of depositors, negatively affected by the previous bankers’ failures, the 
Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was created in 1983. From 1984 residents can 
hold deposits in foreign currencies and banks assets abroad. To develop the new financial 
markets, the Istanbul Stock Exchange was created in 1985. At the same time, a new banking 
law, to reduce the fragility of the sector, compelled banks to hold minimal reserves for their 
capital adequacy and to record non-performing loans separately and cover them by reserves. 
This law also introduced a standardized accounting system and imposed to banks the 
obligation of annual regular external audit. Since 1986, the Banking supervision department 
of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (TCMB, henceforth) is involved in the 
supervision of the system under the control of the Treasury. Besides, the TCMB began its 
open market operations in 1987.  
The third phase (1988-1994), expected as the outcome period of the reforms, marked 
the opening of the capital account (liberalised in August 1989) and the liberalisation of the 
foreign exchange market. Banks became free to determine their exchange rates but their 
contribution to the financing of the economy remained rather shy and the opening of the 
market did not provoke the expected consequences on the monetarization of the economy: 
 
[Insert Table 1. Monetary aggregates and bank loans 1980-1994] 
 
At the macroeconomic level, the export-led development strategy which had given the 
growth rates on average raised around 7% a year in the previous phase, met its limits and 
macroeconomic indicators quickly deteriorated. The economy underwent a contraction, the 
growth of the GNP decreased from 9.8% in 1987 to 1.6% in 1989. The current account deficit 
rose to 2.625 billion US$ in 1990 (Table 3). In 1993, the balance was of -6.433 billion with a 
trade account deficit amounting to -14.081 billion. The exports/imports ratio fell from 81.4% 
                                                
1 For more detailed analyses of financial crises in developing countries in a Minskian vein, the reader is referred 
to Schroeder (2002) and to Frenkel and Rapetti (2009). 
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in 1988 to 52.1% in 1993. This picture has also been accompanied by strong fluctuations in 
the exchange rate US$/TL (Turkish Lira): 
 
[Insert Table 2. Annual change of US$/TL 1987-1993] 
 
During the reforms, strong pressures have hung also over the labour market due to the 
population growth and the continuous migration towards big cities. The disparities were 
persisting; the Gini coefficient was rising from 0.44 in 1987 to 0.49 in 1994. In 1994, the 
average income of the upper quintile in the national income was 9.2 and 11.9 times more than 
the average incomes of the lower quintile, respectively, in the rural zones and in the urban 
zones (Şenses, 2003, p. 94). Although the rate of absolute poverty was relatively low on 
average (7.3% in 1994), it was very high in the poorest region (14.5%) while it was 2.3% in 
the richest region, denoting a very strong interregional disparity. 
Liberalisation policies occasioned then a change in the regime of accumulation which 
is jammed between a very unstable growth path - unable to improve the general well-being of 
the population – and an increasingly fragile monetary and financial structure - unable to 
contribute to the financing of the production and to the macroeconomic stability. The outcome 
of this evolution has been a large-scale twin crisis (exchange and banking crises) in 1994, 
launching recurrent stabilisation programmes with ambiguous effects on the expected 
cleaning up of the economy. 
After more than a decade of reforms, the imbalances became dependent on the 
volatility of short-term capital flows. The sensitivity of these flows, increasing under the 
influence of international (Gulf crisis in 1990-91) and national events, had generated 
pressures on the growth path. 
[Insert Table 3. Macroeconomic indicators 1980-1994] 
 
From 1990, the economy has had high growth rates but without really stabilising the 
key indicators. In spite of a restrictive monetary policy, the inflationary trend had been 
persistent. The consumer price index (CPI) varied over 1983-1994 between 31.4 and 106.3%. 
Despite an increased competition on financial markets, interest rates remained high. Over the 
period 1983-1994, the average rates of interest on term deposits have been between 45% and 
95.6%. The average interbank repo rate of interest was of 39.09% in 1986 and of 106.31% in 
1995. Macroeconomic fragilities fed the increasing internal and external deficits. Domestic 
debt stock/GNP ratio varied between 21.9% and 20.6% over the period while the external 
debt/GNP ratio followed an ascending evolution by which the share of the short-term debt 
increased parallel to the total external debt (Table 3). 
In order to mitigate the persistency of the disequilibrium, the Turkish government 
started a disinflation programme from the mid-1998 under the control of the IMF. But the 
effects of the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998 have provoked a break in the capital 
inflows in 1998 without causing banking and exchange crises. However, the uncertainties of 
the Turkish general election of April and the earthquakes in 1999 have contributed to the 
deterioration of the public accounts. In light of the persistency of inflation and the 
deterioration of economic activity (economic growth declined from 3.9 % in 1998 to -6.1% in 
1999), the authorities opted for another programme of disinflation, based this time on the 
external credibility of the national currency. They put into place a crawling peg exchange 
regime at the end of 1999 with the approval of the IMF.  
While a new banking law and the creation of the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency (BRSA) tried to frame this programme, strong tensions on the liquidity of the 
banking system appeared and 5 private banks have been declared insolvent and transferred to 
the SDIF. These tensions provoked, in November, 2000, sharp increases in interest rates and 
markets’ expectations turned to a close devaluation. The monetary stabilisation policy, based 
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on an almost fixed exchange rate regime, in an environment of free capital movements, 
showed itself unbearable. 
 
[Insert table 4. Macroeconomic indicators 1995-2001] 
 
While the competitiveness has been deteriorated and financial markets remained very 
weakly directed to the financing of productive activities, the economy became completely 
dependent on capital inflows for the sustainability of the external debt. Also the short open 
position of the banking system has started to increase; of 4.6 billion US$ in 1999 it raised to 
8.55 billion in 2000. The mechanisms of financing, under the influence of a high volatility of 
interest rates, underwent then what we can call the macular degeneration2. The short rates 
(from 1 day to 1 month) increased from 70% to 300% at the end of November 2000 and in 
December 4, they reached 2500%. The central bank continued to defend its exchange-rate-
stabilisation programme whereas the imbalances persisted and soiled the relevance of the 
growth regime’s sustainability. The ratio of current account/FX reserves, highly fluctuating 
and often negative, shrank from 8.97% in 1998 to -43.13% in 2000: 
 
[Insert Table 5. Current account and FX reserves 1992-2001] 
 
The capital outflows put the market into a position of illiquidity. In November 2000, 
5.037 billion dollars outflowed. During the first five months of 2001, the net outflows had 
been about 3.562 billion. The IMF announced, in December 2000, an additional line of loan 
of 7.5 billion dollars and the government declared its guarantee on all the commitments. But 
despite this prompt financing from the IMF, markets’ ardours have not been calmed; the 
capital outflows became more marked and resulted in February 2001 in the gravest crisis of 
the republican history: a depreciation of about 60%; the short rates had been fluctuating until 
5000% between 21/12/2000 and 19/03/2001 to come down to 150% in May 2001 and to 66% 
at the end of the same year. 
The high sensitivity of the economy to the problems of illiquidity is increased by a 
preliminary inappropriate preparation of the financial liberalisation. Alper and Öniş (2002) 
characterize the role played by the banking system in the escalation of imbalances by the 
distortions inferred by the dominance of public banks, the problem of open positions of banks 
and the ‘politicization’ of new entries into the banking sector. Özkan-Günay and Günay 
(2007) identify the inadequate regulatory system, the weak supervision and the political 
interferences as the main factors that contributed to the intensification of the banking system 
fragilities. Yayla et al. (2008) underline the high sensitivity of the Turkish banking and 
financial markets and the weight of a high probability of systemic default until 2003 resulting 
from the institutional vulnerability of banks to the volatility of capital and risk markets. The 
weaknesses of regulatory mechanisms which reduced the capacity of supervision and 
intervention of the authorities appear to be a decisive concern in this picture. The absence of 
new regulatory rules that should accompany the process of liberalisation left the banking 
system in a highly risky environment (Green et al. 2005).  
 
4. Banking risks inferred by irregular behaviour 
Contrary to the hypotheses of shock therapy models, there is no spontaneous mechanism of 
competition which could push market actors to adopt efficient behaviour at the 
macroeconomic level. In fact, the reforms reduce sharply the efficiency and the range of 
                                                
2 Macular degeneration is a loss of vision in the center of the visual field (the macula) because of damage to the 
retina. Macular degeneration, in the Turkish case, made it difficult or impossible to recognize vulnerabilities, 
although enough peripheral vision remained to allow short-term economic activities. 
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regulatory mechanisms on banking and financial markets, distort behaviour of economic 
agents and create a fragile environment where the increasing uncertainty push agents to take 
short-term opportunistic positions.  
The first type of irregular behaviour in the Turkish experience is the distortion led by 
the rule of the public banks whose loan strategies remained under the influence of the 
electoral considerations. This has also accompanied the rent-seeking strategies of certain 
groups of interest close to the government and generated the tunneling phenomenon (Johnson 
et al. 2000). The tunneling is the appropriation, through illegal ways, of the assets and profits 
of a firm by a small group of persons who hold the control of management and decision. This 
phenomenon is not specific to the liberalisation but it is well fuelled in such an environment. 
Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) support the idea that this phenomenon is related to the 
capture of the power (state capture) by some groups of interest after the liberalisation. The 
corruption of the power develops between public decision-makers and private actors because 
of the deficiencies and weaknesses of regulatory mechanisms implemented by the authorities. 
Generally, in economies where the state capture is strong, some public institutions are 
intended to supply advantages to lobbies and influential firms without trying to improve the 
institutional structure and the modalities of management of economic relations. In such a 
context, instead of contributing to revitalize and to modernize the sector, the entry of new 
and/or foreign banks is directed to operations of implicit cooperation with public authorities 
or with domestic banks aiming to benefit from high returns on an increasing national debt. 
Two public banks (Ziraat Bankası and Halk Bank) were at the centre of this process after the 
crisis of 1994. Six stabilisation programmes, aiming mainly at reducing the importance of 
extra budgetary funds, have had the effect of placing the burden of the distribution of rents on 
these establishments. In addition, the entry into the sector has been dominated by similar 
political considerations (Alper and Öniş, 2002). After the elections of 1991, six new private 
banks are authorized to enter the sector through networks of influence between some 
industrial groups and the government and they all went bankrupt in the following years. An 
eloquent example is the case of four banks, Interbank, Türkbank, İmarbank and Egebank, 
owners of which were close to the government and which have been transferred to the SDIF 
from 1999 (FEMISE, 2005) with huge costs of bankruptcy estimated at several billion dollars.  
The second type of irregular behaviour, having dominated markets from the first phase 
of reforms and observed also by Arestis and Singh (2010) as one of the reasons explaining the 
failure of the liberalisation is the increased wild competition that led to exaggerated risk-
taking and then to massive bank failures. Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argued that 
with the increase of the competition on financial markets banks are more incited to enter into 
competition for the collection of deposits by offering higher interest rates to the expenses, 
often, of their balance-sheet stability. This, accompanied by the limited liability of banks in 
the regulatory system, creates an environment dominated by the moral hazard; the highly 
risky investments - the cost of bankruptcy of which is partially transferable on public funds - 
becoming more attractive. More interesting is that the model suggests that on highly 
competitive markets, there is no equilibrium at which a bank would choose to invest in a 
sound way. Indeed, banks adopt excessively optimistic and short-sighted positions by 
financing firms or holdings which are not financially and economically sound.  
An incentive factor of this macular degeneration is the way of financing the national 
debt through speculative instruments which fed a new regime of financial accumulation. In 
the first phases of reforms, the need of financing of the public sector reported to the GNP 
followed a downward path (passing from 8.8% in 1980 to 5.7% in 1989). But from the 1990s, 
a noteworthy increase is observed reaching 7.4% in 1990 and 12% in 1993. Then, from the 
1990 onwards, the borrowing requirement of the debt has directed the monetary policies and 
consequently banks’ strategies (Aydın, 2002). The continuous increase of returns on the 
national debt financing incited private banks to neglect the distribution of credit in the 
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economy. The ratio between Domestic bank loans (DBL) and Public debt held by banks (as 
Government bonds and Treasury bills, PBB) fell in a considerable way denoting a real 
modification in the market strategy of the banking system. Now, between 1986 and 2001, on a 
consolidated base, the bank assets increased more than the GNP (Table 6) without improving 
the real sector financing. One can observe, on the contrary, a decline of the share of 
commercial loans; the ratio DBL/GNP decreased from 19.6% to 18.1% over the period 
whereas the ratio DBL/Bank deposits shrank from 70.4% to 31%: 
[Insert Table 6. Change of banks’ market strategies 1986-2001] 
 
Özatay and Sak (2003) explain that the 2001 crisis has started through the increase of 
the fragilities of the banking sector. The risk accumulation and the rise of imbalances for the 
whole sector are mainly related to the involvement of banks in speculative operations through 
very short-term commitments that are mismatched in their maturity as well as in their 
currency denomination and accompany an increase of non-performing loans. In such a 
strategy, the banking system external borrowing in foreign currencies has been used to 
finance the public debt in TL. The ratio FX Liabilities/Total Liabilities of banks went from 
11.7% in 1986 to 42.7% in 1995 and to 50.8% in 2001. So, since the 1990s, the external open 
positions of banks were increasing, banks trying to benefit from uncovered interest 
differentials without improving their structural profitability in a stable way: 
 
[Insert Table 7.  Open positions and the profitability ratio of the banking system 1988-2000] 
 
So we find one of the characteristics of a speculative environment with a structural 
incentive for banks to continuously feed their short open positions. Under such circumstances, 
a currency crisis usually provokes a banking crisis. When the monetary authorities remain 
attached to the anchoring of the exchange rate in spite of increasing public debt borrowing 
requirement, banks are encouraged to finance public issues through their FX borrowing from 
abroad, so the phenomenon of dollarization becomes dominant. The part of FX assets in total 
bank assets increased from 26% in 1998 to 38% in 1999 and that of FX liabilities from 25% 
to 48%. The share of FX deposits in total bank deposits was 50% in 1999 and 61% in 2001 
with an average term of 3 months.  
Mohanty and Klau (2004) maintain that the monetary authorities in emerging 
countries are in front of a dilemma by respecting their anti-inflationary commitments through 
a fixed exchange rate to obtain foreign capital that holds interest rates at high levels and 
harms economic growth. As also argued by Stiglitz et al. (2006), constraints can be more 
binding on emerging economies than on advanced ones as the authorities are not always able 
to use counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies; they are under the constraint of calming 
the ardours of foreign capital flows. In such an environment, the main activity of the Turkish 
banks was based on foreign capital inflows led by the stabilisation of the exchange rate, what 
allowed investors to arbitrate between domestic and international rates. Then, the viability of 
the system became closely dependent on the probability of a sudden depreciation. The 
persistency of the current account deficit and the vulnerability of the banking system 
prevented the structural transformations from reaching a stable macroeconomic state and 
stumbled over a sudden stop of the capital flows. The consequence of this crisis has been to 
contract the GDP of 9.5% in real terms and the domestic demand of 21% in 2001. 
The crisis intervention was designed to overcome banking system’s and public debt’s 
weaknesses while meeting the claims of the creditors. Much of the crisis resolution effort has 
been used to pay foreign private liabilities and to cover the outflows of foreign portfolio 
investments. Without a credible strategy for involving the private sector (and especially 
bankers and debt holders) in crisis resolution through temporary standstills on sovereign debt, 
the Turkish government has been reluctant to implement long-term structural development-
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seeking policies for fear of worsening its access to global capital markets. Such a choice put 
the burden of the resolution on the entire economy, saving the rentier (bond-holding) class 
and aggravate the difficulties in managing the debt (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
 
5. Great expectations, deceptive recovery and future trouble in the wake of the financial 
turmoil 
It is usually admitted that after the 2001 crisis, Turkey succeeded to improve some of its 
fragilities through an inflation-targeting monetary policy, a public-debt reducing fiscal policy 
(with a primary surplus objective of 6.5% on average) and the restructuring of the banking 
system’s balance sheets. Actually, the current weaknesses of the Turkish economy are not 
principally founded on the banking system’s exposition to external downturns at least in the 
short-term while the contribution of the banking system to the financing of the real economy 
remains excessively low (the ratio Bank loans/GDP is one of the lowest amongst emerging 
economies. See Table 9). On the whole, the Turkish banking system has been restructured 
especially by decreasing its exposition to foreign exchange risks. The number of banks has 
been reduced to 49 as by 2008 with a relatively high concentration; the share of the five 
biggest banks is 60% higher than the average share of the Euro zone (of 45%). The ratio of 
Deposits/GDP has increased to 50% (albeit less than the 117% of the Euro zone). However, 
the Bank balance-sheet/GDP ratio remains one of the lowest of the EU (less than 90%, just 
above that of Poland and Romania). The dollarization is, nevertheless, reduced as the ratio of 
Foreign currency deposits/Total deposits decreased from more than 40% in the 1990s to less 
than 33% on 2005-2009. As the share of foreign banks in domestic banks’ capital structure 
remains low (less than 25% in 2008 and 2009, less than the new members of the EU), Turkish 
banks have not been involved in the 2007/08 financial crisis. The profitability (net profit/total 
assets) of the sector reached again its levels of the pre-2001 crisis with an average of 2.1% on 
2003-2008 with a net interest margin of 4.6% on average, higher than that of US banks 
(3.5%) and of EU banks (1.1%) on the same period. Also, the return on equity ratio evolved 
on average around 15.8% (USA: 10.9% and EU: 10.3%, with sharp decrease from 2008). The 
capital adequacy ratio remains high on average albeit on a decreasing path: 
 
[Insert Table 8. Banking system’s capital adequacy ratio (%) 2003-2008] 
 
Therefore, one can assert that Turkey has adopted the best practices in its financial 
management in the wake of the 2001 crisis. However, the fact that Turkey was strongly hit in 
many ways by the current financial crisis shows that a financially liberalised economy always 
keeps many sources of vulnerability as it remains prone to the effects of changes in external 
financial markets. As noted by Cardarelli et al. (2009), the financial stress plays a precursor 
role in the economic slowdown. A rapid expansion of bank credit, sharp rise in house prices 
and increasing borrowing by the corporate/household sectors contribute to a higher 
probability for the financial stress lead to severe economic downturns. Countries whose 
financial systems are dominated by more arm’s-length based markets tend to be under 
financial turmoil effects and pronounced propagating shocks. Therefore, “prudential measures 
as well as monetary policy should pay due regard to the vulnerabilities that may build up and 
that eventually lead to greater output losses if the financial system is hit by a severe shock” 
(Cardarelli et al. 2009, p. 25). So, Rodrik asserts that “Lesson number one is that policy needs 
to guard not just against domestic shocks, but also shocks that emanate from financial 
instability elsewhere” (2009, pp. 1-2). This has several implications for the financial-openness 
policies for emerging economies like the Turkey.  
Financial liberalisation was exposed emerging economies to the high speculative 
sensitivity of external capital flows under the permanent threat of a sudden stop. Domestic 
banks as well as corporate sector borrowing needs are starved of external financing; the 
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investment and the production are retrenched and aggravate the fall in domestic demand. The 
global-capital-flows-dependency3 dictates the monetary and exchange policies to the Turkish 
authorities who tried to hold domestic rates sufficiently high to capture more external flows 
they need to sustain the current account deficit. Real interest rates have evolved between 10-
15% during mid-2006/mid-2009 before decreasing at the end of 2009 under more 
accommodating monetary policies in the face of the global downturn. Foreign direct 
investment flows decreased to 18.3 billion in 2008 and to 8 billion in 2009 after having 
followed an explosive path going up from 2.8 billion US$ in 2004 to 10 billion in 2005 with 
continuous peaks in 2006 (20.2 billion) and in 2007 (22 billion). Parallel to this, stock market 
prices accompanied the rise of that of developed financial markets inducing a sort of asset 
inflation and fuelling speculative expectations. Istanbul Stock Exchange index (ISE 100) 
passed from 25000 in the mid-2005 to more than 55000 at the beginning of 2008. After a 
decline up to 20000-25000 till the mid-2009, it has increased again up to 65000 during 2010 
preparing the ground for a new boom-and-bust cycle which is usually brought through the 
cyclical nature of agents’ preference toward risk on weakly regulated domestic financial 
markets (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009).  
In the current crisis, there are some speculative opportunities that external capital can 
keep. After a sharp capital outflow in 2008-2009, Turkey had become a sizable recipient of 
inflows once again at the end of 2009. In almost the same way, after a sharp depreciation at 
the beginning of 2009, the TL had already begun to appreciate by the mid-2009. While these 
resumptions in external confidence have prevented the economy from a financial collapse, the 
relatively high level of interest rates and an appreciated domestic currency posed the problem 
of under-competitiveness for the economy. As a result, a sharp decline in real GDP has 
reached its bottom in 2009. The quick recovery of the economic activity from the end of 2009 
could show that the worst of the crisis is over. But the Turkish economy seems not to be able 
to prevent the world-wide consequences of the current financial turmoil as its vulnerabilities 
remain worrisome.  
The pre-crisis vulnerabilities such as large deficits, wrongly-directed credit growth and 
high levels of short-term debt are giving cause for concern and remain open to several 
spillovers. Changes in the international trade and international borrowing conditions serve as 
key transmission channels. While not directly exposed to the roots of the financial crisis on 
advanced markets, many emerging economies experience sharp downturns. Even in the 
economies with relatively low international financial integration, financial channels transmit 
advanced economies’ imbalances as well as the trade channels spur similar distress in 
emerging economies. Such spillovers are called by Masson (1998) ‘mansoonal effects’ as the 
policies implemented in industrial countries can contemporaneously provoke crisis effects in 
emerging economies through trade linkages and the dependency of emerging economies’ 
stabilisation programmes on the monetary and exchange rate policies in advanced economies. 
Actually, the high growth era in the aftermath of the 2001 Turkish crisis was not due 
to a strengthening of internal (improvement of income distribution, expansionist stabilisation 
policies, etc.) and external (current account balance and capital inflows) resilience but to the 
cyclical opportunities due to the global speculative boom in the world during 2003-2007. As 
also stated by Ocampo (2009, p. 716), the high performance in this period was a result of “the 
intensity of favourable external factors rather than of improvements in economic policy, 
which overall remained pro-cyclical in most countries”. The Turkish economy remained on a 
fragile path with an average of 5-6% of current account deficit/GDP ratio that seems to 
increase parallel to the growth rate during the booms and to maintain its path despite the 
reversal of the latter as in 2009-2010.  
                                                
3 For several insightful studies on this issue, see Hein (2008).  
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[Insert Table 9. Macroeconomic indicators 1999-2009] 
 
Then the second lesson emphasized by Rodrik (2009, p. 2) is related to the growth 
strategy of emerging economies. It is worth to note that in Turkey, the unemployment rate has 
remained high despite strong economic growth rates since 2001 denoting low performance on 
the macroeconomic front. This seems to be related to the new (perverse) accumulation regime 
of the economy since the beginning of its liberalisation process. The Turkish economy has 
followed, as stated in the previous sections, through its integration into the liberalised 
international circuits the same pattern that of the developed economies’ finance-based growth 
regime. Stockhammer (2009) suggests the notion of ‘finance-dominated’ accumulation 
regime as the financial developments shape the pattern and the pace of accumulation in 
economies integrated into the globalisation process and which implement wage moderation 
policies and credit-driven consumption models through increasing current account deficits. 
The unemployment rate which was around 10% between 2005-mid-2008, increased from the 
mid-2008 up to 16% and from the end of 2009, it shrank to 13% (net of seasonal changes) 
while the employment rate kept its average low level around 42%. According to the data of 
October 2010, the unemployment rate has reached, at the end of July 2010, 10.6% with 13.6% 
when the agriculture is excluded and 19.5% for the youth unemployment. In addition, while 
on a slightly decreasing path, the Gini coefficient remains high around 0.40 since 2006, 
according to a report of TÜİK of 2010 on distribution of annual incomes by quintiles ordered 
by household disposal income. That reveals that high growth rates of the boom period did 
failed to put the economy on a job-creating regime of accumulation. As stated by Uygur, “In 
spite of the relatively high growth rates and substantial productivity increases in the 2000s 
until 2007, there was hardly any rise in real wages (...). In the first six months of the recent 
recession of 2008-09, real wages fell and it is highly likely that they will continue falling in 
2009, as they did in the earlier crises” (2010, p. 8). 
In addition, the external deficit continued its rising path (Table 9) and unlike the 
changes in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, exports fell just after the current crisis under the 
effect of the contraction in the global trade. Then the external demand did not operate as an 
adjustment mechanism in Turkey. This has also contributed to the widening of the trade 
account deficit. In the wake of the current crisis, the exports to Latin America and Middle-
East countries increased whereas the exports to EU decreased. However, this counter-cyclical 
diversification of exports has not yet improved the trade balance because of the lower shares 
of these new markets in the Turkish external trade. Then, on the whole, the international trade 
downturn from developed regions contracted Turkey’s exports by almost 27% in the last 
quarter of 2008; so, exports kept a decreasing path passing from an average of 35 billion US$ 
in the first quarters of 2008 to 25 billion per quarter from the end of 2008. However, in 2009, 
Turkish exports were down by 23% year-on-year, imports also contracted even faster by 45% 
and the current account deficit went down by 67%. But this trend was reversed in 2010; 
imports rose by 34% more than the increase of exports (by 15%) leading again to the 
expansion of the current account deficit (TSPAKB, 2010). This shrank also the trade revenues 
of the economy relatively to its debt level; the ratio Gross external debt/Exports (Fob), felt 
from 231.2% in 2005 to 209.9% in 2008, picked up again in 2009 (262.7%) and in 2010 
(2010Q1: 246.9; 2010Q2: 237.8, Undersecretary of Treasury, 2010). 
 Under such circumstances, the real sector has been impacted through two main 
channels; the contraction of the external demand since the end of 2008 and the fall of the 
domestic demand as the contribution of resident households’ final consumption decreased 
sharply from 2008, accompanied by an impressive contraction of private investment (the 
GFCF passing from 3.1% in 2007 to -6.2 in 2008 and to -19.2 in 2009): 
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[Insert  Table 10. Contribution of expenditure types to growth rates of GDP (% at 1998 
prices) 2005-2009] 
 
Such a reversal has obviously accompanied the high volatility of the growth rate 
during the last three years: 
 
[Insert Table 11. GDP annual growth rates (% at 1998 prices) 2007-2010]  
 
Contrary to the decrease of the formal external financial dependency of the banking 
sector, the external debt position of the private corporate sector has followed an increasing 
path since the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. The Private corporate sector’s external debt/GDP 
(%) has been particularly worsened on 2005-2009 (17.5% in 2005 and 27.8% in 2009): 
 
[Insert Table 12. Gross external debt stock (at the end of the year, million US$) 2002-2010] 
 
As one can easily observe (Tables 3, 4 and 12), the share of the short term external 
debt in the total external debt stock has not really been stabilised on a decreasing path in the 
subsequent period to the 2001 crisis. This share which has reached 23.9% in 2000 and gone 
down to 15.97% in 2003 and to 17.28% in 2007 rose again to 20.43% in the first quarter of 
2010.  
The same path of increasing vulnerabilities can be observed in the evolution of the 
public sector’s gross debt stock (% of GDP) while this level remains below the level of most 
of the EU countries (EU27 around 62 to 73.6% over 2004-2009); the stock which had had a 
decreasing path on 2002-2007 (going from 73.7% to 39.4%), has reached 45.5% in 2009. 
Parallel to this, the public sector borrowing requirement (% of GDP), after having decreased 
from 12.1% to -1.9% between 2001 and 2006, crept up to high levels passing from 0.1% in 
2007 to 6.4% in 2009 (Undersecretary of Treasury, 2010). Also the public sector primary 
surplus (IMF definition, % of GDP), which had increased from 0.3% on average in 1993-
2002 to 5% in 2003-2006, decreased again sharply from 3.1% in 2007 to -1.1% in 2009, 
manifesting external dependency effects on the national economy. 
Such developments reveal that the Turkish economy remains under the threat of two 
major fragilities: the persistent external debt-dependent economic activity (especially for the 
corporate sector but also, indirectly, for the banking sector) and the lack of competitiveness 
which submits the whole economy to the international trade uncertainties and increases its 
debt burden. These fragilities could hurt the seeming economic stability if the international 
context in the aftermath of the current global turmoil comes to remove the global markets’ 
volatilities from developed to emerging economies. These fragilities would also keep strong 
the external constraints that dominate domestic economic policies since the 1990s and prevent 
possible development strategies from improving the income distribution inequalities and the 
domestic demand in a sustainable way.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Debates on the processes of transition in emerging economies towards a more open market 
economy and on the consequences of the financial liberalisation in a vulnerable 
macroeconomic environment underline the complexity of the phenomenon of liberalisation. 
This complexity appears with more strength today to the observation of the difficulties that 
the developed financial systems undergo since 2007. However, the transformations 
implemented in the Turkish banking system since the 1980s and the ambiguous subsequent 
results can be used as a study case suited to estimate the relevance of the modalities of 
banking reforms and financial liberalisation. They can also allow us to underline the central 
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role that the nature of growth policies, incentive mechanisms, reformed rules and regulation 
can play in the success and the stability expected from this process. 
This analysis of the path of the Turkish economy after three decades of liberalisation 
reveals that the country evolves in the current crisis with important concerns some part of 
which is related to unswept structural weaknesses of an internationally integrated emerging 
economy. Inherent structural failures and lack of long-term directed national and ‘voluntarist’ 
proactive development strategies make that the economy remains unable to reach a 
sustainable and more resilient path of growth. The Turkish reforms have been carried out 
through an extremely fragile macroeconomic frame (banking system weaknesses, inadequate 
stabilisation programmes). In particular from the end of 1999, in spite of increasing deficits, 
these programmes have been based on the exchange rate stability to reduce the inflation and 
to improve the international credibility of the monetary policy. This modality of stabilisation 
has provoked an infernal spiral by feeding the underlying macroeconomic and structural 
imbalances and increasing the vulnerability of the banking system the main transformation of 
which had been based on a hasty generalized liberalisation. Myopia to disaster and a highly 
speculative behaviour, which testify of a macular degeneration, arose from irregular banking 
behaviour under the pressure of markets wildly liberalised. This evolution resulted in 
recurring banking crises (1982-84, 1994, 2000-2001) and showed that the reforms depend on 
the consistency of the economic policies regarding the capacities and needs of the economy in 
order to reduce the probability of structural distortions. Even from a neoclassical point of 
view, liberal reforms must be sequenced with meticulous care and gradually implemented to 
mitigate the fragilities of financial and non-financial firms (Bhattacharya, 1997). It seems that 
any overflowing of financial markets on the absorption capacities of the economy provokes 
hardly controllable negative consequences and reduces the sustainability of the growth path 
by creating imbalances which self-feed through uncontrolled global volatilities. 
Developing and emerging economies suffer from several problems but as it is well 
stated by Rodrik, “As the experience of successful countries demonstrates, what is required is 
strategic prioritization” (2009, p. 12). The only hastily implemented financial liberalisation, 
founded on the belief that free markets clear up spontaneously, could not provide a 
sustainable growth. To date, with the current turmoil, market-oriented policies proponents 
recognize the relevance of macro regulation. But a consistent conclusion cannot be founded 
only on the strengthening of market-friendly prudential regulation and supervision but before 
all requires some safeguards against global flows’ speculative volatilities. Because capital 
inflows exacerbate the investment constraint and then reduce economic growth through their 
effect on the direction of economic policies, the financial openness can constitute a handicap 
rather than a suitable source of real growth financing. Foreign borrowing boosted growth in 
Turkey as private returns in tradables were relatively high parallel to high current account 
deficit. But this growth has not focused on job creation. Large external deficit remained as a 
blockage factor against the widening of the positive impacts of the growth. More domestic 
saving mobilisation and the use of funds into job creating activities seem to be the necessary 
conditions for a sustainable recovery. That requires a substantial effort in terms of new 
development policies based on the creation of quality and technology producing activities 
beyond the short-term private returns in tradables. It is advisable to develop policies within 
the framework of a macroeconomic action plan beyond the beliefs of the liberalism. One of 
the first actions to be undertaken in this objective consists in channelling the financial markets 
regarding the imperatives of the stable development.  
The Turkish example shows that these conditions and mechanisms are not 
spontaneously reached by liberalised markets and by the risky dismantling of the public 
mechanisms of supervision. Financial sustainability (Debt/GNP) and the economic 
sustainability (competitiveness and growth) are weakened by the new regime of accumulation 
based on conservative monetary policies and on finance-dominated markets. Such a regime, 
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founding the modernization of economy on a fast and weakly structured liberalisation and 
aiming to satisfy the requirements of short-term stabilisation programmes without considering 
capacities and needs of the economy, cannot bear the required economic growth in the future. 
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Tables to be inserted into the text 
Table 1. Monetary aggregates and bank loans 1980-1994 
(%) 1980 1983 1988 1989 1993 1994 
M1/GNP 13.28 13.93 8.77 8.5 6.48 5.94 
M2/GNP 16.63 23.6 21.06 20.47 14.16 16.22 
Domestic bank loans/GNP 25.01 24.59 23.17 19.43 22.72 19.91 
Source: TÜİK, 2006 
 
Table 2. Annual change of US$/TL 1987-1993  
1987 34,72 % 
1988 78,03 % 
1989 49 % 
1990 26,7 % 
1991 73,4 % 
1992 68,6 % 
1993 68,98 % 
Source: Author’s calculations from TCMB and TÜİK 2006 et 2009 
 
Table3. Macroeconomic indicators 1980-1994 
(%) 1980 1983 1987 1988 1989 1990 1993 1994 
CPI (change/year) 101.4 31.4 38.9 73.7 63.3 60.3 66.1 106.3 
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Average interest rate on 1 year deposits  
(end of the year) 
33 45 52 83.9 58.8 59.4 74.7 95.6 
Discount rate of TCMB 26 48.5 45 54 54 45 54.5 55 
Growth rate (GNP, constant prices) -2.8 4.2 9.8 1.5 1.6 9.4 8.1 -6.1 
Domestic debt Stock/GNP 13.6 22.8 23 22 18.2 14.4 17.9 20.6 
External debt Stock/GNP 19.34 31.08 46.79 45.02 38.82 32.59 37.45 48.29 
External debt service/GNP 0.29 6.03 5.9 7.44 6.44 4.79 4.44 6.99 
Share of  
the short-term external debt/Total external debt 
n. a. 11.86 18.95 15.76 13.76 19.37 27.51 17.24 
Current account (million  US$) -3408 -1923 -806 1596 961 -2625 -6433 2631 
Trade account (millions US$) -4603 -2990 -3206 -1813 -4190 -9448 -14081 -4167 
Current account/GNP -4.98 -3.18 -0.94 1.76 0.89 -1.74 -3.6 2.0 
Total domestic bank loans/GNP 25.01 24.59 27.74 23.17 19.43 18.62 22.72 19.91 
Source: TÜİK, 2006 and 2009 
 
Table 4. Macroeconomic indicators 1995-2001  
(%) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
CPI (change/year) 88 80.4 85.7 84.7 64.9 54.9 54.4 
Average interest rate on 1  
year deposits (end of the year) 
91.30 93.80 96.6 95.5 46.7 45.6 62.5 
Discount rate of TCMB 50 57 67 80 60 70 70 
Growth rate (GNP, constant  
prices) 
8 7.1 8.3 3.9 -6.1 6.3 -9.5 
Domestic debt stock/GNP * 17.3 21 21.4 21.7 29.3 29 69.2 
External debt stock/GNP * 41.93 43.45 43.8 46.6 55.7 59.3 78 
External debt service/GNP 5.77 6.2 6.5 8 9.9 11 16.9 
Share of the short-term external  
debt/Total external debt * 
21.43 21.5 21 21.6 22.2 23.9 14.4 
Current account (million US$) -2339 -2437 -2638 -2000 -925 -9920 3760 
Trade account (million US$) -13152 -10264 -15048 -14038 -9771 -22057 -3363 
Current account/GNP -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 1.0 -0.73 -4.9 2.3 
Total domestic bank loans/GNP 20.66 24.44 27.02 22 22.19 22.81 20.46 
* New series from 1996.  
Source: TÜİK, 2006 and 2009 
 
Table 5. Current account and FX reserves 1992-2001 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
(A) Current 
account  
(million US$) 
-974 -6433 2631 -2339 -2437 -2638 2000 -925 -9920 3760 
(B) FX 
reserves  
(million US$) 
4800 6900 5300 13300 15700 17400 22300 22200 23000 19100 
A/B (%) -20.29 -93.2 49.64 -17.58 -15.52 -15.16 8.97 -4.16 -43.13 19.7 
(Author’s calculations from the data of TÜİK 2006 and TCMB) 
 
Table 6. Change of banks’ market strategies 1986-2001 
 (%) 1986 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001 
DBL/ 
PBB 
6,8 4,5 3,7 3,5 4,3 3,5 3,7 3,9 3,9 5,2 3,5 4,8 3,1 1,6 1,8 0,6 
PBB/ 
Total  
issue of  
public 
bonds 
n. a. 77,7 90,5 90,2 85,9 92,8 79,1 77,8 71,5 81,6 84,4 89,5 86,8 85,3 75,9 74,5 
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Assets/ 
GNP 
45,4 52,4 49,9 42,4 38,8 41,5 45,1 47,8 45,6 46,8 54,1 59,4 62,55 82,75 76,3 85,1 
DBL/ 
Bank 
deposits 
70,4 72,7 64,7 62,8 74,3 63,9 66,5 76,1 49,4 56,5 57 66,12 54,14 40,25 47,08 31 
Source: TCMB, Undersecretary of Treasury and Aydın, 2002 
 
Table 7.  Open positions and the profitability ratio of the banking system 1988-2000 
(%) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
FXAssets/FX 
Liabilities 
103.8 105.3 88.1 90 86.8 84.6 96.5 90.6 93.6 89.6 84.9 79.4 76 
Open 
position* 
/Equity 
Capital 
-14.6 -16.5 39.6 44.2 80.7 104.8 26.6 73.4 50.6 81.1 123.1 362.7 212.2 
Net profit 
(end of 
period)/Total 
Assets 
n. a. 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.5 2.2 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.7 -0.6 -3.1 
* FX Liabilities-FX Assets. A negative value means a long position, assets being higher than liabilities. 
Source: TBB, 2009 
Table 8. Banking system’s capital adequacy ratio (%) 2003-2008  
 USA Banks EU Banks Turkish Banks 
2003 12.8 12.4 30.9 
2004 12.6 11.9 28.8 
2005 12.3 11.4 23.7 
2006 12.4 11.1 21.9 
2007 12.2 11.4 18.9 
2008 12.7 11.7 18 
Source: TCMB May, 2010 
Table 9. Macroeconomic indicators* 1999-2009  
(%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
CPI (change/year) 54.9 54.4 45 25.3 10.6 8.2 9.6 8.8 10.4 6.5 9 
(average  
on 
Jan-Sept) 
Average interest  
rate on 1 year  
deposits (end of  
the year) 
45.6 62.5 48.2 28.6 22.6 20.38 23.72 21.3 25.68 15.7  
Discount rate  
of TCMB 
70 70 55 43 38 23 27 25 25 19→15  
(at the end  
of the year) 
# 
GNP growth rate 
(1998prices)* 
6.3 -9.5 7.9 5.9 9.9 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.7 11 
(Jan-Aug) 
Domestic  
debt stock/GNP* 
--------------------- 
New series 
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21.9 
 
69.2 
 
 
50.9 
54.5 
 
 
42.8 
54.5 
 
 
42.7 
52.3 
 
 
40.2 
50.3 
 
 
37.7 
43.7 
 
 
33.2 
42.3 
 
 
30.3 
39.2 
 
 
27.2 
44.4 
 
 
34.64 
 
External  
debt stock/GNP* 
--------------------- 
New series 
59.3 
 
 
44.69 
78 
 
 
57.74 
71.9 
 
 
56.2 
60.6 
 
 
47.26 
54.2 
 
 
41.24 
47.4 
 
 
35.25 
53 
 
 
39.44 
52 
 
 
38.45 
51 
 
 
37.5 
 
 
 
43.4 
 
External debt 
service/GNP** 
11 16.9 12.5 9.1 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.2 Q4:9.3  
Share of  
short-term external  
debt/Total  
external debt 
23.9 14.4 12.6 15.9 20.1 22.4 20.5 17.3 18.2 18.75  
Current account  
(billion  US$)** 
-9.92 3.76 -0.6 -7.5 -14.4 -22.2 -32.9 -38.3 -41.9 -14.4 -27.98 
(Jan-August) 
Trade account  
(billion US$) 
-22.05 -3.36 -6.4 -13.49 -22.73 -33.1 -41.06 -46.79 -53.02 -24.89 -32.04 
(Jan-Aug) 
20 
 
Current  
account/GNP 
-4.9 2.3 -0.3 -2.5 -3.7 -4.6 -6.1 -5.9 -5.7 Q4/ 
-2.3*** 
-5.4 
(target) 
Total domestic  
bank loans/GDP**** 
17.2 15.3  10.32 11.88 14.91 20.53 24.59 27.14 31.15 34.89  
* From 2002, the ratios are calculated on the basis of GDP while there is no great difference between the GNP 
and the GDP in the Turkish economy. 
** New series from 2002. 
*** Current account balance targets (% of GDP) are: 2011: -5.4; 2012: -5.3; 2013: -5.2. 
****Regarding Table 4, I used the last data offered by the TCMB to calculate again the ratio for the whole 
banking system’s domestic loans to the economy (interbank loans are excluded) at current prices. In the first two 
quarters of 2010, total bank loans have increased of 23.6% with regard to the previous year value). 
# TCMB kept its one-week repo lending rate at 7% for the 11th month and also reduced the overnight borrowing 
interest rate from 6.25% to 5.75% and held the lending rate at 8.75%. Late Liquidity Window Interest Rates 
(between 4:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.): Lending rate was kept at 11.75% and the interest rate on borrowing facilities 
provided for primary dealers via repo transactions was kept constant at 7.75 percent (TCMB, Decision of the 
Monetary Policy Committee, October 14, 2010).   
Source: TÜİK 2009, 2010 and TCMB 
Table 10. Contribution of expenditure types to growth rates of GDP (% at 1998 prices)  
2005-2009  
 Resident 
households  
final consumption  
Gross fixed 
capital formation 
(GFCF) 
2005 5.6 3.9 
2006 3.3 3.2 
2007 3.8 0.8 
2008 -0.2 -1.5 
2009 -1.6 -4.5 
Source: TÜIK 2010 
Table 11. GDP annual growth rates (% at 1998 prices) 2007-2010  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Q1 8.1 7.0 -14.5 11.7 
Q2 3.8 3.6 -7.7 10.3 
Q3 3.2 0.9 -2.9  
Q4 4.2 -7.0 6.0  
Source: TCMB 2010 
Table 12. Gross external debt stock (at the end of the year, million US$) 2002-2010  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Q1 
A. Total 129532 144097 160977 169901 207819 249553 277005 268194 266605 
A.1.Short-term 16424 23013 32205 38283 42616 43135 50448 49577 54472 
Public sector 915 1341 1840 2133 1750 2163 3248 3598 4697 
Private banks 5429 8351 12714 16562 19993 16167 21613 22127 26342 
Non-financial 
corporate 
8425 10461 13960 16178 17601 22061 23494 21785 21466 
A.2.Long-term 113108 121084 128772 131618 165203 206418 226557 218617 212133 
Public sector 63619 69503 73828 68278 69837 71361 75037 79819 80174 
Private banks 3029 3133 5798 12341 22078 30941 30049 27993 26746 
Non-financial 
corporate 
24350 24783 28245 34604 53736 79625 98224 91831 87937 
B. Share of the non-
financial private 
corporate sector in 
total external debt* 
0.253 0.245 0.262 0.299 0.343 0.407 0.439 0.424 0.410 
* Author’s calculations from the data of TCMB   Source: TCMB. 
